catalyzed such confrontation or stirred such strong emotions as the battle over 'right-to-work" (RTW) laws. The 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act granted states the power to pass laws which outlaw the union shop --a contract provision which requires new employees to join and pay dues to the union.1 Table 1 displays the states where laws have been passed and the date of passage. A few states passed laws prior to 1947 but their legal status ws in jeopardy until Taft-Hartley.
The philosophical debate turns on the classic confrontation between freedom and free riders. Unions certified by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) as the bargaining acient for a group of workers known as the bargaining unit must represent all the employees in the unit in negotiations and grievance handling, whether or not they join the union. Dependinci on one's perspective then, union security clauses either ensure that workers pay their fair share of representation costs or force them to join an organization which they do not necessarily favor.
The controversy over these laws is a puzzle to many labor economists because most recent studies have found that RTW laws have little real In contrast we explore the impact of the laws on union organizing -- Wyoming 1963 -3- can simultaneously examine two questions. We can of course collect evidence of the impact of RTW laws on organizing itself. And we can qain considerable insight into the impact of the laws on the level of unionism since adjustments to the stock must come in the form of flows. Moreover our emphasis on organizing provides us with an opportunity to overcome some of the methodological problems which have confronted previous authors.
It is our finding that the number of workers in newly organized bargaining units is substantilly reduced in the first decade after passage of a right-to-work law, particularly in the first five years.
The reduction arises largely from a shrinking in the number of certification elections held and from a reduction in the average number of workers in each new unit. In later years the effects are relatively small.
Our results suggest that a decade after passacie, the reduced organizing will have lead to a 5% reduction in the number of union members, and our results are consistent with a prediction that the 5% reduction is permanent.
Nonetheless our data does not allow definitive statements about the long term effects the laws have on the level of unionism in a state partially because we do not observe flows out of unionism and partially because of uncertainty about the exact size of the long term impact on new organizinq.
We begin with a discussion of stock models of union membership and a discussion of some of the problems which have confronted previous authors.
We discuss an alternative approach which focuses on flows. We describe our model and its specification. We present results for all fifty states and then for seven states where data are available to allow controls for fixed effects and for a rough test for simultaneity/exogeneity.
Next we decompose our dependent variable into several components to -4- examine the mechanisms whereby unionism is reduced. We conclude with a discussion of the results and their implications.
Stock Models of Unionism
We take as our starting point the standard reduced form' model of the stock of union membership which 'is common in the literature on the level of union membership and which has been used commonly in the right-to-work research. 
Simultaneity
Other authors have wrestled with issues of causality and simultaneity.
The fear is that in states where unions command a larger share of the work force, their political power is greater and thus they can influence whether or not a right-to-work law is passed. Although this is arguably similar to the omitted variable bias problem, it is conceptually distinct,
The solution proposed by several authors is to estimate cross sectional, simultaneous equations models where the level of union membership and the probability of the state having a RTW law is estimated simultaneously.
The problem with these models is that identification is achieved either When conditions change, and the equilibrium level of union membership is higher or lower than the existing level, the stock must adjust somehow.
In many ways, the adjustment process is similar to that in a putty-clay model of capital. Once established, bargaining units tend to remain in place and decay or depreciate slowly because the units fortunes are largely tied to the fortunes of the firm. Each year a few union plants go out of business. The stock would be reduced if organizing did not compensate.
Just as in such models of capital, organizing (or new investment in union capital stock) will be sensitive to changes in the union climate. And changes which lead to a permanent reduction in the equilibrium level of unionism will lead to dramatic falls in new organizing until the stock has adjusted.
We envision a partial adjustment accelerator model whereby: After the initial fall, organizing would increase slowly and would ultimately stabilize at a new level of 1.5%. Thus in the first five years after passage, organizing would be depressed by nearly 40% on average. In the next five organizing would be reduced about 20%. And ultimately it ought to be 10% lower overall than previously. Such large changes in organizing ought to be easy to observe and measure.
By contrast the stock of union workers would decline by just -10- Years From RTW Law Passage Figure 1 , rather than some other pattern, it is powerful evidence that RN laws do in fact have real impact.
In fact since stock and flow models always have a correspondence, these same methods could be applied to accurate annual data on the stock of membership. The advantages to using an organizing model rather than one based on stocks is that annual data are available and thiss flow ought to be very sensitive to changes in the union environment. A 50% change in a measured variable is much easier to capture than a 5% change.
A Model of Union Organizing
We can begin with a simplistic model derived from equations (1) and (2) .
If we assume instantaneous adjustment we can derive:
ORGIt/LFt = LXitB
Although this instantaneous adjustment model is unrealistic, it does point out that new organizaton is influenced by changes in exogenous variables (including RTW), by the need to organize new workers when the labor force is growing, and by the need to replace members lost to the various flows out of unionism. A model that allows for non-instantaneous adjustment would look stmilar but it would include many lagged values of X and RTW and LF.
We experimented with a variety of specifications involving a considerable number of laqged independent variables, non-linear functional forms, and multiple interactions. Ultimately we found a straightforward loglinear specification, which included both levels of the explanatory variables (the Xs) and the change in these variables in the previous five years as the independent variables, to be the most stable and intelliqible. For obvious reasons, we concentrated particular attention on our RTW variable.
We ran state cross-section annual time-series regressions for the period from 1951 to 1977. Our primary dependent variable is the natural log of ORG/LF --the number of employees in bargaining units where unions won an NLRB election divided by the non-agricultural labor force in the state. As independent variables we have included variables which measure demographic and industrial structure, local tastes and preferences, economic conditions, and the governmental/legal environment.
Demographic characteristics of workers are emphasized as important determinants of the levels of union membership by virtually every student of union membership.
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The most commonly cited factors are sex and race. Women typically display weaker labor force attachment than men. If their expected tenure is shorter than that of their male counterparts, the present value of long term gains to unionism is reduced so that the up-front organizational costs are likely to be a greater deterrent to organizing a union.8
Blacks, on the other hand, may be more inclined toward unions as a defensive reaction to employer discrimination.9 In addition, urban residents are generally considered more likely to organize)0 Apparently, small towns suffer diseconomies of scale and/or different attitudes toward unionism.
In our models, %FEMALE and %BLACKS and %URBAN represent the proportion of the non-agricultural labor force which is female, black, living in urbanized areas, respectively. This is the heart of the simultaneity issue and requires particular attention in any RTW study even though o-ur methodology allows for a correction of these problems. Ashenfelter and Pencavel used the percentage of a state's
Congressional delegation which was Democratic as a measure of attitudes towards unions.12 We chose to use a similar but more sophisticated proxy.
The AFL-CIO publishes a so-called COPE rating for each Congressman based on his/her voting record. Using this information, we derived our own COPE rating for each state over five year periods based on the voting behavior of a state's Congressional delegation on key labor issues over that five year time. The variable was detrended so that the variable measures preferences in the state relative to the national average over any five year period. Changes in organization caused by movements in the national average will be picked up on our time dumies as described below.
Freeman and Medoff have pointed out that an important feature of local tastes and preferences which has been ignored in most empirical work, is local employer oppostion.' In our work we include a variable, TOUGH, which represents the number of unfair labor practice charges filed against employers divided by the number of elections in each state. We also include a five year average change in both TOUGH and COPE in our models.
Finally, in our fifty state regression, region dummy variables are also included to attempt to capture any differences in attitudes prevalent in a particular region. The unique environment of the South may negatively influence union organizing. This region may be difficult to organize because of the nature, composition, and location of industry, the surplus of low-income agricultural workers, the influence of racial prejudice, the prevailing ideology, and the strong anti-union attitude existinq among The results presented on The region dumies show a surprising pattern. When controls, we used for demographics, structure, tastes and preferences, and the presence of a RTW law were included, SOUTH no longer has a negative coefficient. Indeed the coefficient was higher than those for North or West. Without these controls the variable was strongly negative.
The lower rate of organizing in the South therefore can apparently be 'explained" by the factors included in the equation.
The short run cyclical variable %CHGW, the difference between the annual wage change and the long run trend, had the expected positive sign d was significant. Wage growth which is 6% higher than average, yields a 10% increase in organizing. The long run trend in wages had no influence here. Je experimented with a variety of functional forms using lagged values of %CHGW; none yielded satisfactory results.
As expected states with greater employment growth had higher levels of organizing. A 10% growth rate in employment caused organizing to grow by l7%.16 The yearly time dummies are not reported here, but they show a strong negative trend. Relative to 1950, the 1977 dummy
shows that organization has fallen by 40%, other things equal.
Finally we turn to examine the impact of RN laws based on the fifty state regression.
-23-
The Effects of RTW
The coefficients on the RTW variables are quite consistent with the hypothesis that the passage of a RTW law diminishes the equilibrium level of unionism and that a partial adjustment model characterizes the resulting changes in organizing. In the first five years following passage of a RTW law in a state, organizing is reduced by 50%. In the next five years, it is reduced by roughly 25%. In later years it appears to be reduced somewh&t, though we do not have sufficient data to conclude that the reduction is statistically significant.
Over our sample period, employees in new bargaining units average 2% of all union workers --i.e. the flow is roughly 2% per year. If organizing falls by 50% for five years and 25% during the next five, then after 10 years, membership will be roughly 7% lower than it would have been otherwise. If 7% was the true long run reduction, then once the new equilibrium is achieved organizing should be permanently depressed by 7%.
In our data, the standard errors on the dumy variables capturing the impact of the laws after 10 years are typically around 8%. Thus the modest 7% long term reduction could not show up as statistically It is possible, however, that organizing is depressed only in the short run. Then the stock would also be diminished only in the short-run. We think it is more plausible that the stock is permanently reduced by 5 to 10%, but other interpretations of the lonq-tern impact are possible.
If there is a permanent reduction in the stock, it is easy to see that with the relatively small sample sizes available for the stock equations estimated by previous authors, a statistically significant impact amounting to 5% might not be detected. After all, the standard errors in our equations which have considerably more observations make measurements that precise impossible.
It is possible, however, that the results reported in these fifty state regressions are spurious, and that either omitted variable bias or simultaneity contaminates the results. We turn then to an examination of these issues by exploring the impact of RTW laws in the seven states where sufficient data on organizing is available both before and after passage of the law to allow fixed effects and simultaneity tests.
Seven State Empirical Results
It seems unlikely that time invariant differences across states could account for the results we have observed. Generally we would not expect that fixed state differences could generate the pattern of a declining impact of RTW laws as time since passage increases. Nonetheless our first step was to determine the impact of fixed effects on a regression based only on these seven states. Those results appear on Table 4 .
-25- Note: All other variables included in Table 3 are included here except YEAR variables which have been collapsed to cover five year intervals.
Because of the smaller number of observations, we needed to make some minor changes in our specification. We collapsed our RTW variables to cover a longer interval. We allowed five year time dummies rather than the individual year dummies we used in the fifty state regression. As an additional test, in these regressions we also controlled for first order serial correlation and for heterskedasticity using the Parks method.
The fixed effect results are remarkably similar to those found in the fifty state regressions. In the first 10 years after passage, organizing is diminished 32% --a figure very similar to the 39% average for Thus, time invariant state differences do not seem to account for the results we find. A second concern is that declining union strength may allow passage of a RTtJ law. Thus reduced organizing and passage of the law are both indications of recently reduced union power. In this case, a leading indicator of impending passage of a RTW law provides an important test. If declining union strength leads to reduced organizing and to the passage of the law, then the period prior to its passage ought to be one where organizing is depressed reflecting the declines in union power. If the RTW law itself causes the declines, then there ought to be no reduction in organizing in the period prior to passage.
We included a leading indicator, labeled PRE-RTW, as a exogeneity/ causality indicator in our seven state regression. This dummy variable took on the value of one only in the period five years before the passage of a RTW law.
It thus captures any changes in organizing just prior to passage of a RTW law.
The results shown on Table 4 are quite striking. In the period before the passage of RTW laws, organizing is not depressed. Indeed, in these seven states, organizing was actually somewhat above average, though the coefficient on PRE-RTW is not significant. The decline in organizing seems to follow the passage of a RTW law, not precede it.
Indeed it is even possible that RN laws are passed when unions appear to be becoming stronger (as evidenced by increased organizing) in order to diminish their strength.
A look at two states where RTW laws were recently passed or repealed offers some final evidence. In the three years prior to passage of Louisanaa RTW law in 1976, an average of 4,024 workers were organized each year; in the three years after, the figure averaged 2,380.
Indiana offers an ideal natural experiment because it is the only state where a law was first passed and later repealed. initially and this reduction may be permanent.
The obvious question remains as to how or why RTW laws have the impact they do. We cannot infer the exact reasons why laws diminish organizing so sharply in the short run. We can, however, decompose the decline and shed some light on the mechanism.
Decomposition of RN Laws Impact
It is possible to decompose MEMB into several components and consider the impact of RTW laws on each of these. The decomposition can be per- Table 5 .
Right-to-work laws seem to have their most important impact in reducing the number of elections held. Over half of the decline in Note: All regressions included all the variables listed in Table 3 . As a result after a right-to-work law is passed, membership is sharply reduced as plants formerly at the margin are now far removed from it.
There is a second interpretation which arose in discussions with those on both sides of the controversy. A major part of the law's impact may be through the pyschological/symbolic effect passage of a RTW law may have on workers. Successful organization requires that a few workers inside a plant take a highly visible and activist role.
The costs to these activists can be enormous, ranging from harrassment to loss of their jobs. Even those who are not activists must take the highly visible step of signing an authorization card. And in considering whether or not to vote for a union, workers often fear they will lose their jobs or suffer other costs if their company is hostile. Thus the perceived strength of the union may be critical to the willingness of activists and others to become involved in an organizing drive. A highly visible defeat such as the passage of a RTW law (or the crushing of PATCO) may severely damage the union's credibility and appeal to workers. There is at least some evidence that the psychological impact may be important. In Missouri, for example, after a RTW law was defeated, new organizing jumped dramatically.
Conclusion
Our results show a strong short-run reduction in union organizing following the passage of a RTW law. Ommitted variable bias and simultaneity problems do not skew our findings. Organizing is reduced by nearly 50% in the first five years after passage of a RN law and by half that amount in the subsequent five. Overall our results suggest that membership in unions is reduced between 5 and 10% after passage.
The findings are consistent with a permanent reduction of this magnitude -33-in the stock though it is also possible that the stock gradually recovers over many decades. It appears that right-to-work laws are not merely symbols. They have real significant effects.
16.
This result does not imply that new organization is more common among new workers. On the contrary, it suggests a very low rate of organizing among new workers. With no employment growth, roughly 2 percent of the work force are organized each year. With 10 percent annual growth in employment, unions should organize a third of the new workers--or 3 percent of the labor force--in addition to the previous 2 percent, just to maintain their relative share of the work force. Instead organizing rises only to 2.5 percent. This result may in part reflect simultaneity. Firms are moving to the areas where organizing is difficult.
